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1 Introduction 
Chains have a perpetuate interest in the Netherlands. Agricultural chains 
consist of connected independent units in the agri-food sector whose aim is to 
realise vertical coordination of behaviour. We argue that common goal-striving 
behaviour does not necessarily satisfy individual goal-objectives. Transfer-
prices can allocate profits in such a way that chain performance is disturbed. 
Chain-management has to cope with the allocation of profits, otherwise chain-
relationships are broken up due to unsatisfied units. In this paper the role of 
the transfer-price for intermediate products is investigated as a profit-allocation 
mechanism. 
2 Change and chain-manifestations 
This coordination of behaviour in chains is induced by the conviction that such 
coordination leads to better performance on agri-food markets. Coordination of 
behaviour is seen as one of the possible answers to the necessity for change, 
brought about by external circumstances (globalisation, environmental laws, 
liability claims, concentration, diversification on markets etc. (Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan, 1989; E. van Heck et al, 1989)). Change in external circumstan­
ces is expected to go on till far into the 21-st century (Boehlje et al, 1995). 
From a physical-flow point of view, a chain consists of several entities that are 
involved in the production and distribution of a product. Restrictions on 
involvement may be founded on pure juridical grounds (e.g. the EC's goals of 
free competition (H. Bremmers, 1995), on the organisational (transaction 
costs) and on the strategic level. Here strategy involves the choice between the 
different options available to reach a goal. The actual physical flow is a mere 
manifestation of goal-striving behaviour. In other words: the actual chain is the 
manifestation of choices made in the past. This chain-manifestation is the 
starting point for new decisions. 
3 Individual and common goal-achievement: cooperation and competition 
There are boundaries to goal-achievement, both individual and collective. 
Individually, for own goals can only be reached within the boundaries of 
163 
achieving common goals, when through physical limitations certain options are 
achievable, and others are not. Mutual dependency can limit the pursuit of 
individual goals. On the other hand, individualistic behaviour can conflict with 
overall chain-performance. 
Chain behaviour is performed with a specific goal, usually the improvement of 
logistics, quality improvement, or the amelioration of information processing. 
From the striving after specific goals it is expected that: 
the performance of the system in total will be better off; 
the increase in performance will benefit all the parties involved. 
As to the first expectation, it should be noted that the expected overall increase 
in performance does not have to occur (M. den Ouden et al, 1992). Units 
involved in a chain use their own performance-measures, which may conflict 
with optimal behaviour from a 'chain-standpoint'. The following examples may 
clarify our standpoint. If a project requires an investment of X, that can be 
spent by either unit A or unit B, the return on investment (ROI) of the project 
if carried out in unit A (ROIpa) will be less than the overall return on invest­
ment of A (ROIJ, and if the return on investment attained by B (ROIpb) will be 
higher than ROIb, unit B will start the project and A will reject it. If ROIpa > 
ROIpb, it would be better from a chain-standpoint that unit A carries out the 
project. If, for instance, quality improvement is realised to a level where 
marginal prevention-costs equal marginal costs of faults, this does not necessa­
rily increase chain-profits, since fixed overheads that occur at some stage in 
the chain or at some unit in the chain, does not influence the short-term 
optimum. If just-in-time delivery is enhanced at the final stages in the chain, it 
can mean that at the intermediate product-level larger quantities of goods have 
to be held in store. 
The second expectation is important for perpetuate cooperation and contributi­
on to chain-performance. The expectation is that all units involved will be 
better off. If there are units in a chain which in their view do not share enough 
in the advantages of working together, collaboration will be under pressure. 
We submit that an increase in performance of a chain will not always benefit 
all parties involved. If, in optimising chain-profits, outputs are set at a level at 
which marginal chain costs equal marginal returns on the consumer-market, the 
level of the transfer-price will not necessarily influence the (from a chain-
standpoint) optimal production level and market price, since intermediate 
deliveries are neutral to chain-profit. The intermediate prices are, however, 
determinant for the division of profits among the stages of the chain. The 
division of profits influences behaviour in itself and this induced behaviour can 
mitigate total chain-performance (outline 1). 
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Out l i ne  1  
Interd.epend.ency between chain-performance and the transfer-pricing 
system 
The following examples demonstrate the interdependency between chain-
performance and distribution of benefits. Special attention is paid to transfer-
pricing problems. Transfer-prices are prices that link pre-final market compa­
nies that are involved in producing or processing a product. 
3.1 No capacity constraints, no external market 
If there are no capacity-constraints and no external market exists for an 
intermediate product, then the transfer-price should be set at a level of margi­
nal costs in the intermediate company at the optimal output-level of the total 
chain (C. Drury et al, 1992). This transfer-price would result in the intermedi­
ate stage not making any profit. It would not survive in a competitive market 
(total costs are not covered, which is necessary for long-term investments). 
This is one of the reasons why a cost-plus transfer price is recommended (see 
C. Tomkins, 1990), or ex-post redistribution-mechanisms are applied (for 
instance by means of a second transfer-price). Let us consider the situation 
depicted in outline 2 and suppose that the chain-partners depend solely on each 
other (that a bilateral monopoly exists). 
Outline 2 
I  I I  
iPi Ç2P2 
Closed1 physical chain, connecting two entities: I and II 
q, = quantity transferred from stage I to stage II 
p, = price for the intermediate product (transfer price) 
q2 = quantity sold at an external market 
p2 = market price of the final product 
1 With the term 'closed chain' we depict the situation in which the firms are 
mutually dependent. 
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The profit that company (I) realises can be represented by the following 
equation: 
Pi = qPi - Vj(q) - Q 
Pi = Profit of stage I 
q = quantity processed by stage I, II 
v,(q) = variable costs, dependent on quantity processed 
C, = fixed costs in stage I 
If company (I) maximizes profits by adapting its output (q), then the following 
condition should hold for profit-maximation: 
dP2 #P2 dv^q) —- = 0 A -<0; so p, = —-— 
dq dq2 1 dq 
The above equality states that the first stage transfers products at a price that 
equals marginal costs. Profits for company (II) consist of the following 
components: 
P2 = qp2(q) - qPi - v2(q) - c2 
If company (II) wishes to maximize profits, then: 
dP2 n A &P2 -a. .. ^ 2(9) 0 A <0; so = p. +v. 
dq dq2 dq 2 
dqp2(q) 
"v2= Pi 
dq 
The equation makes clear that the second company is willing to pay a transfer 
price that equals 'the marginal value of productivity' of the factor that is 
supplied by stage I (see: M. Shubik, 1959). The left side of the equation is 
known as the net marginal revenue (C. Drury, 1992; C. Emmanuel et al, 
1994). The optimal output and the transfer price that will emerge can be 
illustrated in outline 3. 
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Outline 3 
Revenue/ 
Costs 
Marginal costs of firm I 
ABD = profit firm II 
BCD = profit firm i 
Emmanuel & Mehafdi (1994), adj. 
Suppose that total costs in company (I) equal 2q2 + 3q + 5 and (for reasons 
of convenience) company (II) has an identical cost-function. The price of the 
end-product (p2) depends on quantity supplied, for instance as follows: p2 = -
4q + 30|0<q< 7,5. Then from dPj/dq! = pj - 4q - 3 =0 and dP2/dq 
= -12q - pj + 27 = 0 it follows that q* = 1,5 and p! = 9 (= marginal costs 
at the optimal output level). The division of profits is = -0,5 and P2* = 
8,5. This implicates that no long-term viable situation exists for stage I unless 
profits are redistributed (for instance by means of a second transfer-price, a 
dual-pricing system). In the above solution to the distribution of profits, firm 
(I) would not however survive. 
The same optimum as calculated can be derived from common profit-
maximation against the final-product market. Total chain profits are Pj + P2 
which equal to p2q + ptq - pjq - 4q2 - 6q - 10. 
Quantity 
d(P^P2) 
dq 
= g; hence p2* = 24 and p^ = 9; (Pj + P2)* = 8. 
It is (as to Shubik (1959)) the solution Von-Neumann and Morgenstern would 
suggest, namely joint collusion against the market (which means playing an 
essential game). However, as to Von Neumann-Morgenstern, common profit 
should be redistributed with side-payments. In the equivalent Nash-solution, 
profits are redistributed taking into account the profits firms would make if 
threat-strategies of non-cooperation were to be adopted. Since a decision to 
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fight would lead to a loss of 5 for each of the companies, total profits would 
be split evenly (M. Shubik, 1959). firm (I) would earn a profit of 4. The 
transfer-price (pj) can be calculated that guarantees this profit: 
P, = 4 = pi x 1,5 - 2 x 1,52 - 3 x 1,5 - 5. Hence P[ = 12. 
Note that if company (II) were to use this transfer-price as one of the parame­
ters for profit maximation, the goal-function would be: P2 = - 6q2 + 15q - 5. 
Hence q* = 1,25, P2 = 4,375 and Pj = 3,125. Total profits would be 7,5 
which is less than the maximum possible, namely 8. Company (I) gains less 
than company (II) looses, so the viability to threats can lead to a non-zero sum 
competitive game. 
3.2 External market 
Consider the case in which company (I) has no capacity-constraints and can 
either sell its intermediate product at a fixed market-price of, for instance 5 (= 
p0), or process it to company (II). Variable costs per unit of the intermediate 
product (v,) are supposed to be constant and 2, and variable costs of the end-
product-company are constant and 6. The market-price of the end-product is 
assumed to be constant and 10. We assume further that the intermediate and 
final product-markets are perfect and competitive. 
Outline 4 
Consider that total output q (= qj + q2) is (apart from capacity influences) 
infinite, since the price is higher than variable costs on both markets. Total 
profits (Pj) of company (I) equal: 
Pi = q0Po + qiPi - vi(q0 + qO - Q 
If there is a perfect market for the intermediate product, pj must equal the 
market price p0. If p, < p0, no transfer to company (II) takes place, as 
company (I) is better off in selling the intermediate product externally than by 
transferring it to company (II)2. Company (II) could buy the necessary prod­
ucts from that same market at a market-price of 5. If pt > p0, firm (II) would 
instantly be better off if the intermediate product is bought from outside the 
chain. Considering that in a situation of decreasing returns output of (I) would 
2 It should be noted that asset specificity (or its cost-accounting counter-part: 
switching-costs) can limit flexibility. 
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be increased up to the point where d(v(q)/dq equals p0, the transfer-price 
would equal marginal costs per unit, which is the market-price of the inter­
mediate product in a competitive market. 
3.3 Capacity-constraints 
If there are one or more capacity-constraints (bottle-necks), individual perform­
ance maximization can work contraproductively for the performance of the 
total chain. 
In the case of capacity-constraints, an optimum can be found and transfer-
prices can be set by means of linear-programming techniques (C. Drury, 
1992). The determined transfer-price is constitutive for the redistribution of 
advantages that are derived from the commonly accepted performance goal(s). 
Consider the chain-manifestation in outline 5 as an example of the depicted 
situation. 
Outline 5 
ÇtiiPn Ç22P22 
I  I I  
Cïl2Pl2 ÇhlPai 
Company (I) produces two intermediate products, qn and q12, under the 
limiting circumstances that qn < 4.000 and q12 < 5.000. The necessary inputs 
for the output in firm II are: 
ÇI21 ÇI22 
qn 2 1 
qi2 0,5 1 
Variable costs per unit of qn and q12 are supposed to amount to 3 and 4 
respectively. Suppose the sales restrictions for end-products q^ and q22 are 
6.000 and 3.000 units respectively, at fixed selling-prices of 10 and 12. The 
solution that would lead to maximum profits for the total chain would be the 
production and selling of 3.000 units of 0^ and 500 units of q2], leading to 
total profits of 16.000. The transfer-price for qu is 4 (= variable costs of 3 + 
shadow price of 1) and for q12 equals variable costs, as q12 does not limit 
optimal output. So no stimulus for company (I) exists for producing q12, which 
leads to chain-suboptimality3. Performance-goals and transfer-prices have to 
be dictated under these circumstances, which is not really possible in a chain. 
3 Similarly there is no stimulus for company (II) to produce q21, as this product 
does not have a shadow price; see C. Drury, 1992: 770. 
169 
4 Conclusions 
The conclusion must be drawn that there is a strong linkage between the 
economic situation in which a chain develops and its influence on the alloca­
tion of profits over the involved units. This in turn can be seen as a chain-
management problem. In our view chain-management has to be focused on 
reaching mutual agreement, if the goals of independent units and of the chain 
in total diverge. To formulate such an agreement, criteria are necessary for 
measuring total chain-performance and the contribution of individual parties to 
total chain-performance. These criteria have yet to be developed, and it is 
questionable whether the market-mechanism can provide enough incentives for 
long-term chain-involvement. In the auction system for vegetables, fruit and 
flowers for instance, transfer-prices are determined by market-price mechan­
isms. This only leads to an optimal chain-result where there is a perfect 
external market. Perfect market conditions do not exist nowadays: in many 
cases information assymetry occurs (O.E. Williamson 1975, 1985). 
Some authors (e.g. Van Dalen, 1994) proclaim chain-leadership as a possible 
solution for diverging goals among parties within a chain. Chain-leadership 
however requires legitimation: criteria have to be developed that focus all 
efforts in the same direction; criteria are needed too if redistribution of 
surpluses has to take place. Without such criteria, chain-leadership means no 
more than an exhibition of power: financial power means that the strongest 
partner will collect all the benefits (under the present circumstances this is the 
retailer, for sales on consumer markets usually limit activities). 
5 Future research 
In the preceding discussion we have seen two different, but intertwined, 
problems: chain optimization and the division of the surplus that is rendered by 
common effort. What does this mean for future research? 
first, the manifestation of chains in reality can be analysed by using 
management-accounting techniques, using short and long-term costs and 
profits as variables. 
second, bargaining between parties involves game theory, whereby the 
parameters of the game are set, among others, by cost factors and factors 
influencing the redistribution of profits. Introduction of selling costs, 
costs of coordination and transaction complicates the pictures presented, 
but does not alter the presented models significantly, 
third, a definition of 'chain' in abstracto is useless, as 'chain' is an ex-
post concept: It merely depicts actual or realized physical flows. Chain-
strategy is the ex-ante concept, and the chain is the realisation of 
imputed strategy. The chain-realisation is the starting point for future 
decisions. The possibility of simulations of chain manifestations from an 
economic perspective should be further investigated. 
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fourth, the significance for chain-manifestations of topics like quality, 
environmental risk etc., can be analysed by transforming these risks in 
terms of costs and revenues and their distribution, 
fifth, chains will have a certain stability if the individual advantage that 
is gathered from working together surpasses the benefits of alternative 
capacity application. The benefits that flow to a seperate entity depend 
on total chain-performance and the share of total gains that it can secure 
for itself. 
To make statements on chain-performance and the division of gains, modelling 
is of primary importance. The development of models that can explain behav­
iour in and of chains is still in its initial stages, especially if one looks at 
financial performance as a determinant for behaviour. There is a great deal of 
work to be done in the near future. 
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